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Abstract 
 
 
Although the classed dimensions of ‘taste’ have, following Bourdieu, been widely 
discussed, expressions of disgust at perceived violations of taste have been less 
frequently considered in relation to class.  This paper considers various 
expressions of disgust at white working-class existence and explores what they 
might tell us about middle-class identities and identifications.  I argue that the 
narratives of decline and of lack present in such representations can be seen in 
terms of a long-standing middle-class project of distinguishing itself.  Drawing on 
Bourdieu’s critique of Kantian aesthetics, I argue that the ownership of ‘taste’ is 
understood as reflecting true humanity, and as conferring uniqueness.  Ironically, 
however, this uniqueness is only achieved through an incorporation of collective, 
classed understandings.  The paper calls for a problematization of a normative 
and normalized middle-class location that is, I argue, given added legitimacy by a 
perceived decline in the significance of class itself.
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Disgusted subjects: the making of middle-class identities 
 
[A]n account of class, rank or social hierarchy must be thin indeed unless 
accompanied by an account of the passions and sentiments that sustain it 
(William Miller, The Anatomy of Disgust, p. 245). 
 
Social identity lies in difference, and difference is asserted against what is 
closest, which represents the greatest threat (Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction, 
p. 479). 
 
What we read as objective class divisions are produced and maintained by 
the middle class in the minutiae of everyday practice, as judgements of 
culture are put into effect (Beverley Skeggs, Class, Self, Culture, p. 118). 
 
Introduction 
George Orwell, writing in the 1930s, famously declared ‘the real secret of class 
distinctions in the West’ to be summed up in ‘four frightful words’: ‘The lower 
classes smell’ (Orwell, 1975 [1937]: 112.  Emphasis in original).  What was at 
issue for Orwell was less literal smell (real or imagined) than what ‘smell’ signifies 
– the alterity, for the middle classes, of working-class existence.  Orwell’s concern 
was with the ways in which the middle classes are disgusted (and can hardly help 
but be disgusted) at working-class existence.  It is at the very core of their 
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subjectivity: their very selves are produced in opposition to 'the low' and the low 
cannot do anything but repulse them. This is not simply a matter of cognition but 
is bound up with middle-class identity: Orwell continues (in a phrase that 
prefigures Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus): ‘The fact has got to be faced that to 
abolish class-distinctions means abolishing a part of yourself’ (Orwell, 1975 
[1937]: 141). 
This paper attempts to map some of the contemporary dimensions of the 
two axes of class relations highlighted in Orwell’s account – that is, the (negative) 
affective and cathectic aspects of class relations, and the implications of such 
aspects for middle-class identities and identifications.  In it, I argue that, although 
Orwell’s analysis might reasonably be seen as dated, expressions of disgust at 
white working-class existence remain rife among middle-class commentators.  
Further, I argue that such expressions of disgust can tell us a great deal about the 
ways in which middle-classness relies on the expulsion and exclusion of (what is 
held to be) white working-classness.  My focus is on the white working class 
because, in a racializing move which, one might say, 'hyper-whitens' them, there 
is, increasingly, an implicit coding of 'the working class' as white (Haylett, 2001; 
McRobbie, 2001)1.   Of course, working-class people are not exclusively white, 
but their emblematic whiteness might be necessary to a continued 
disparagement2.   
 
Class, in this context, is conceptualised as a dynamic process which is the 
site of political struggle, rather than as a set of static and empty positions waiting 
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to be filled by indicators such as employment and housing.  It is the result of a 
historical process in which the bourgeoisie became a 'class for itself' through 
distinguishing itself from its twin others - the aristocracy and the poor (later to be 
designated 'the working class/es’) (Finch, 1993).  Although there have clearly 
been important social, economic and political changes in both working-class and 
middle-class life in all classed societies over the last one hundred or so years, my 
argument here focuses on the relational, rather than the substantive, 
manifestations of classed existence. 
As I have indicated, my specific focus here is on the many expressions of 
disgust at white working-class existence within the British media and other public 
forums.  These expressions – cutting across conventional Left /Right distinctions 
– have largely passed without comment.  Perhaps they pass without notice.  I will 
ask, why are white working-class people constituted as disgusting in their 
appearance, behaviour and taste? And what are the implications of such a coding 
for classed relations? While my focus is on the UK, there are indications that the 
argument has a broader purchase than this: in the USA, for example, 'white trash' 
has long been a label of disgust and contempt3.  To illustrate my argument here, I 
will use representations from a range of sites - from journalism, popular writing 
and academic texts.  These representations are not intended to stand as a 
representative sample, nor would I claim that this is the only way in which 
working-class people are represented4.  Rather, what I am concerned with is what 
is respectably sayable within a given cultural formation; with what constitutes a 
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‘common understanding’ – in Bourdieu’s terms, the realm of the doxic.  Although 
this cultural space is always contested and never fixed, I hope to show the ways 
in which it rests on a set of shared meanings about what working-class people are 
(and hence, what the middle classes are not, and could not be).  That is, working 
class-ness forms the constitutive outside to middle-class existence.  While classes 
are not homogeneous entities, I will argue that there is sufficient shared 
understanding among what we might call a public bourgeoisie (comprising 
academics, broadsheet journalists, social commentators and the like) about what 
working-class people are like to speak about a set of doxic constitutions of 'the 
working class'.  No doubt this is a specific class fraction - one with access to the 
means of representation - but precisely because of this access, it is an important 
and influential one5.  The issue here is not simply about middle-class people 
'looking down on' working-class people.  Such understandings work to produce 
working-class people as abhorrent and as foundationally 'other' to a middle-class 
existence that is silently marked as normal and desirable.  But  - and more 
fundamentally for my argument here - they also work to produce middle-classed 
identities that rely on not being the repellent and disgusting 'other'. 
So, let me stress that the argument here is not about working-class people 
themselves, but about the ways in which they are described and their 
‘problematic’ characteristics are rehearsed by middle-class people.  As Skeggs 
(2004) points out, such representations have nothing to do with working-class 
people themselves, but they can tell us something about the ways in which 
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working-class people are othered and, hence, something about a normative and 
normalized middle-classness. 
 
Disgusting subjects: narratives of lack… 
 
If people are embarrassed and evasive when discussing class as a system 
(Savage et al 2001) there seems little embarrassment in characterizing white 
working-class people in the most horrific and disgusting terms. True, they are 
rarely named in class terms.  But it is clear who the targets are, nevertheless.   Let 
me begin this section by quoting one of many expressions of disgust, contempt 
and horror within broadsheet newspapers at a political protest in which white 
working-class people protested against child sex abusers being housed on their 
council (public ownership) housing estate: 
   
There on TV were the mums (no dads) faces studded, shoulders tattooed, 
too-small pink singlets worn over shell-suit bottoms, pallid faces under 
peroxided hair telling tales of a diet of hamburgers, cigarettes and 
pesticides. 
And they’d taught their three-year-old kids (on whose behalf all this was 
supposedly being done) to chant slogans about hanging and killing.  
Paulsgrove Woman, I felt, was of an alien race to me.  No wonder the BBC 
employed anthropologists with cut-glass accents to interpret these people 
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for the sake of their bemused viewers.  Never had the social divide seemed 
so wide (Aaronovitch, 2000). 
 
I have discussed this protest elsewhere (Lawler, 2002) and I will not rehearse the 
arguments again.  What I do want to note is the way in which Aaronovitch 
assumes that the TV viewers will be ‘bemused’ by ‘Paulsgrove woman’ - that not 
only he but everyone finds her alien.  This is a very common move in which a 
fictive ‘we’ is established that symbolically excludes anyone not middle-class.  
The women’s appearance is itself held to be disgusting, but also to signify a 
'deeper', pathological and repellent subjectivity.  What is more, what is acceptable 
in one setting (piercings and tattoos as an example of individual expression in the 
young middle class) is coded entirely differently here, where it is used to signify 
the reverse - a collective, even a mob-like, identity6.  The (classical) 
anthropologist’s gaze is repeatedly turned on white working-class people, such 
that they become the horrific and mystifying others.  But it is an anthropological 
gaze with none of the respect that 'the exotic' might (however problematically) 
command (Back, 2002).  This specular relation has a long history.  Historically, 
the poor have long been associated with the material and the embodied 
(Bourdieu, 1986; Porter, 2003); the Cartesian mind/body split has not conferred 
the status of 'pure mind' on them.  It is as if they are just too material.  As we will 
see, this materiality has profound consequences in terms of a coding of the 
working class as repellent. 
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Bodies - their appearance, their bearing and their adornment - are central 
in representations of white working-class people.  References to shell suits, or to 
'large gold earrings [and] tightly-permed head' (Gillan, 12. 08.00) or to the 'Essex 
girl' whose 'big bottom is barely covered by a denim mini-skirt' (Greer, in Skeggs, 
2003:2) do a great deal of work in coding a whole way of life that is deemed to be 
repellent.   As with Orwell's account of the Brookers in The Road to Wigan Pier, 
the act of description itself seems enough to confer blame: 'mostly on then but 
also in part on the world that generates them' (Miller, 1997:244).  In a kind of join-
the-dots pathologization, the reader is left to fill in the picture by understanding 
that certain kinds of clothing, location, and bodily appearance indicate a deeper, 
underlying pathology, as in this extract from Mark Hudson's memoir, Coming Up 
Brockens, an account of his stay in a County Durham pit village: 
[A] group of schoolgirls was approaching along the pavement.  One of 
them, a tall, brawny girl with a shapeless mop of hair, was directly in my 
path.  I caught her intent look.  She imagined that finally, from some 
Pavlovian courtesy, I was going to make way for her. 
No you don't, I thought.  Not here.  Not in this shithole.   
At the last minute she leapt aside (Hudson, 1994: 16-17) 
 
Here, as in other texts7, the landscape is elided with a personal aesthetic to 
render its inhabitants horrific and pathological.  This spatialization of class is, in 
many ways, consistent with the logic of class as classification itself, since, as 
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Walkerdine (2003) notes, from its Nineteenth Century beginnings, ‘class’ as a 
mode of classification was linked with the mapping of areas of cities in terms of 
disease and crime.  This mapping, in turn, was linked with the classification of the 
inhabitants of such areas in terms of faulty psychologies which had to be 
described and ‘explained’.  So, while this is not a new spatialization, it might be 
seen to be intensified with the advent of geodemographic software (Burrows and 
Ellison, 2004) and websites such as upmystreet.com which arguably lend a 
renewed ‘scientificity’ to the kind of folk knowledge which, in Britain, frequently 
signifies class in terms of geographical location (as in jokes about ‘Essex girls’ 
and ‘Scousers’, for example).  More fundamentally, it might be seen to be 
intensified by a neo-liberal emphasis on self-improvement which eclipses any 
grammar of exploitation with the use of a language of individual  psychology 
(Walkerdine, 2003), such that specific areas (cast as horrific or repulsive) come to 
be associated with populations that are similarly understood. 
This is why both landscape and inhabitants are so frequently described in 
terms of lack.  But this is not, primarily, a lack of material resources, but a lack of 
'taste', knowledge, and the 'right ways of being and doing' (Bourdieu, 1986: 511).  
For Hudson, appearance and landscape combine in such a way that their 
(assumed) lack suggests a lack of humanity itself.  Although he resists the worst 
excesses of narratives which posit a golden age, he still presents the white 
working-class people he observes as exotic specimens marked by a 
repulsiveness which means that they do not deserve the basic courtesy of 
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standing aside for them on a pavement. But, more than this, Hudson’s text 
conveys his evident astonishment and horror that there even exist landscapes like 
this, housing people like this.   
I have pointed to the ways in which the appearance of both landscape and 
inhabitants acts as a marked of an assumed faulty psychology.  But even when 
the appearance of working-class people is not explicitly invoked, the list of their 
'faulty' character traits is endless.  They are the young males who are 'weakly 
socialized and weakly socially controlled' (Halsey, 1992: xiv); In the 1970s, 
working-class women were 'notorious bingo-women who neglect their children' 
(Hopkins, 1974: 25), or the parents who use 'cuffs and blows' because they are 
'less able to put their feelings into words' (Kellmer-Pringle, 1974: 50).  Today they 
are summed up as fag-smoking teenage mothers, rearing children in 'deprived 
and arid backgrounds of instability, emotional chaos, parental strife, of moral 
vacuum' (Phillips, in Coward 1994), and whose children will grow up to be 'socially 
autistic adult[s] with little expectation and even less talent' (Odone, in McRobbie, 
2001: 370)..  They are the 'new rabble' amongst whom criminality is rife, who 
abuse and neglect their children (Murray, 1994); the fatherless families who bring 
chaos to their localities and threaten the whole fabric of society (Dennis and 
Erdos, 1992). They suffer from a 'poverty of expectation and dedication' (Blunkett, 
in Carvel, 1998), or a lack of 'interest and support' (Milliband, 2003) which 
militates against their children's school success. They are over-fertile, vulgar, 
tasteless and out of control. Above all, they are held to lack everything perceived 
  
 
 
 
 
11 
as having value. 
This constitution of working-class existence in terms of ‘lack’ is now so 
widespread as to be almost ubiquitous.  It informs social policy (‘social exclusion’ 
presumes a deficit model, as do discussions of ‘widening participation’) and is 
present even in some (though by no means all) analyses which are sympathetic 
to working-class people.  Simon Charlesworth’s (2000) account, for example, 
presents an unremitting picture of bleakness and emptiness, in which life often 
has literally no meaning.  Similarly, Bourdieu’s The Weight of the World (1999) 
conveys little but hopelessness.  Is this about working-class life or about ‘a way of 
looking at it’? (Bourdieu, 2000: 53)  It is clear that ‘misery’ is what Bourdieu and 
his team went looking for, and misery is what they found.  While there is certainly 
no virtue in poverty, or indeed in being on the receiving end of the forms of 
cultural violence that Bourdieu and others have detailed, everything within these 
accounts is bleak.  Yet as Angela McRobbie has argued, ‘even the poor and the 
dispossessed partake in some forms of cultural enjoyment which are collective 
resources which make people what they are’ (McRobbie, 2002: 136).  Or, as 
Skeggs puts it, ‘working-class culture is not point zero of culture; rather, it has a 
different value system, one not recognized by the dominant symbolic economy’ 
(Skeggs, 2004: 153).  While these alternative systems are occluded, there can 
only be lack: one effect of narratives of lack is that they rob the subjects of such 
narratives of any moral value.  But this is given added momentum by an 
accompanying narrative of ‘decline’, discussed next. 
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… and narratives of decline 
 
Narratives of lack are frequently accompanied by implicit or explicit narratives of 
decline, in which, the story goes, there was once a respectable working class 
which held progressive principles and knew its assigned purpose (which, for the 
Left at least, was to bring about social change).  This class has now disappeared, 
to be either absorbed into an allegedly-expanding middle class, or consigned to a 
workless and workshy underclass which lacks taste, is politically retrogressive, 
dresses badly, and above all, is prey to a consumer culture (from which the 
middle classes are, presumably, immune).  In such narratives, the decline of 
heavy industry – often seen as emblematic of working-class existence - is linked 
with a decline in the worth of the working class. Hudson, for example, going in 
search of the family history of stories passed down to him, expresses bitter 
resentment that the present reality does not map on to the place of his 
imagination.  Searching for the past of socialist and progressive solidarity of these 
stories, he finds only an absence: 'The old ways of resistance and communal 
enterprise had gone leaving only a slavish acquiescence at the lowest level of 
consumerism' (Hudson, 1994: 79).  Similarly, though in a more ambiguous vein, 
the journalist, Deborah Orr hints at some of the complexities in her comment that, 
'"Working class" is no longer a term that can be qualified with the word 
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"respectable" because it is now almost always a subtly loaded insult'.  She adds: 
 
The term carries with it implications of the worst sort of conservative, 
retrogressive values, including bad food, bad taste and dreadful gender 
assumptions.  You don't have to be comfortably off to be middle-class, you 
just need to subscribe to progressive attitudes (as the respectable working 
classes so recently did).  Likewise, you don't have to be poor to be working 
class, just common (Orr, 2003) 
 
If 'progressive attitudes' can only be espoused by the middle class, then the 
working class can only be understood as 'retrogressive'.  But note how this 
retrogression rests, not only on (supposed) 'dreadful gender assumptions' but on 
eating bad food and having bad taste: in short, on being common8.  
The relatively recent discourse of 'underclass' does little to change the 
alterity of a group which are constituted on the basis of not being middle class.  
Bev Skeggs (2003) argues that the use of 'underclass' discourse maintains the old 
distinction between the deserving and the undeserving poor; but since 'working-
class' no longer carries any positive valuation, and since in any case 'class' is 
rarely used to refer to the kinds of divisions that would once have been 
axiomatically marked as classed, I would contend that the slippage from working-
class to 'underclass' works to drive out the notion of 'respectability' from the poor 
altogether.  
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It may be, however, that the discourse of underclass enables an easier 
disparagement of the contemporary working class.  Since they are seen to have 
fallen from grace, there is an implication that they not only could but should be 
different.  At the same time, the use of the term 'underclass' casts this group adrift 
from 'the proletariat', who were only ever of interest to the Left because of their 
assigned role in bringing about the revolution, but who have manifestly failed in 
their assigned task of becoming a 'class for itself'.  
Femininity has a specific place in all this.  Representations such as those 
outlined above, while not exclusively targeting women, have tended to focus on 
women as especially repellent objects.  This has a long history:  Finch (1993) has 
noted how a Nineteenth-Century line between the ‘rough’ and the ‘respectable’ 
working-class was primarily drawn on the bodies and behaviours of women and 
Skeggs’ 1997 study shows how little this has changed over more than a century.  
Since respectability is coded as an inherent feature of ‘proper’ femininity, working-
class women must constantly guard against being dis-respectable, but no matter 
how carefully they do this, they are always at risk of being judged as wanting by 
middle-class observers.  And this is a double jeopardy since if working-class 
women can be rendered disgusting by dis-respectability and excess, they have 
also been rendered comic or  disgusting in their attempts to be respectable (the 
character of Hyacinth Bucket in Keeping Up Appearances being a prime 
example).  In this, they have frequently been understood as inhibitors to the class 
struggle so that, as Walkerdine (writing here of the mid Twentieth Century) points 
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out, there ‘was a clear implication that working-class men were the carriers of 
resistance and radicality, with women often being understood as a conservative 
force’ (Walkerdine, 2003: 237). 
But at a time when  resistance and radicality are no longer associated with 
proletarian existence,  the slippage from ‘working-class’ to ‘underclass’ can be 
seen as a feminizing move.  Without an assumed radicality projected on to male 
manual workers, what is left for the middle-class observer to admire?  Public 
discourse appears to have moved from a focus on a masculinized proletariat (the 
‘noble worker’ narrative) to a feminized underclass (the ‘fag-smoking teenage 
mother’ narrative).  The working class /underclass is cast as ‘feminine’ by being 
seen as workless (paid work being erroneously linked with masculinity) (Murray 
1994)  and by a focus on bodily appearance and on reproductive behaviour.   
This, I’d argue, is why there is such an emphasis on women’s bodies and 
behaviour in ‘disgusted’ representations of working-class existence.  But while 
working-classness might be seen as newly feminized, it is not  that ‘the feminine’ 
has become newly problematic in relation to class (it has always been so). 
This begins to point to some of the ways in which ‘decline’ narratives are 
curiously ahistorical.  Only a minority of members of the working class were ever 
able to claim any form of identity as 'noble worker'.  This designation was rarely 
available to women: Skeggs (1997) rightly  points out that there is little that is 
'noble' in the caring work in which many working-class women are engaged.  But, 
more generally, nor does it seem to have been applied to the many working-class 
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women and men engaged in shop work, domestic service, light factory work and 
the like.  Moreover, while participation in certain forms of manual labour was able 
to be mobilized as a positive and worthwhile self-identity for some working-class 
men (Savage et al 2001), it would be mistaken to take this to indicate a positively-
evaluated conferred identity.  It does not follow from a sense of pride in oneself 
and one’s labour that one will be evaluated in positive terms by others.    
Indeed, there is plenty of evidence that a middle-class coding of 'disgusting' 
to mark working class people – both women and men  - is one that has long 
existed.   While 'the working class' in the abstract may have been admired by 
middle-class socialists, working class people seem to have been a different 
matter. To take just some examples:  Finch (1993) and Stallybrass and White 
(1986) have documented expressions of bourgeois disgust at working-class 
people in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries. And Ian Roberts (1999) 
has analysed the many expressions of disgust and abhorrence at working class 
people within post-war community studies - in which an avowed 'objectivity' does 
not prevent  working-class people being cast as immoral, lying, unable to bring up 
their children and suffering from a psychic deficiency - either on the basis of what 
they looked like or because of their unwillingness to concur with the judgements 
of middle-class observers9.   
It seems that working-class people have always represented what is most 
troubling in the body politic.   In Nineteenth Century Britain and the USA, when 
white racial 'purity' was emphasized, the white working class were continually 
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condemned through suggestions of racial 'impurity' - they were not white enough 
(Young, 1995; English, 1999).  Now that there is at least lip-service paid to racial 
'diversity', and perhaps a recognition that 'whiteness' itself might be troublesome, 
the working class becomes too white, embodying a racism that is officially 
condemned10 (Haylett, 2001).  Similarly, working-class people in the Nineteenth 
Century and the first part of the Twentieth Century were condemned for their 
violation of rigid gender norms (Finch, 1993; Roberts, 1999).  Today, although 
they are still characterized as over-sexual and over-fertile, they are seen as 
embracing archaic and overly rigid gender relations - Orr's 'dreadful gender 
assumptions' (see Lawler, 2000).  For about 150 years, ethical and intellectual 
justifications for middle-class disgust at working-class existence have sat side by 
side, forming a neat boundary which precludes any middle-class questioning of 
their own position. 
What has changed in recent years is less the sentiments than the explicit 
naming of class as such.  'Class' is rarely explicitly invoked in contemporary 
expressions of disgust: instead, the 'disgusting' traits are presented as the 
outcome of individual and familial pathology.  Representations of working-class 
people are marked by disapproval or disdain, not for the 'objective' markers of 
their position, but for (what are perceived to be) their identities.  Everything is 
saturated with meaning: their clothes, their bodies, their houses, all are assumed 
to be markers of some 'deeper', pathological form of identity.  This identity is taken 
to be ignorant, brutal and tasteless. As in eugenically-inspired (often retouched) 
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photographs popular at the turn of the Twentieth Century (English, 1999) white 
working-class people's actions and appearance are made to mean: they are made 
to indicate signs of ignorance, stupidity, tastelessness.  An assumed ignorance 
and immorality is read off from an aesthetic which is constituted as faulty.  
Contemporary ‘postmodern’ self-awareness does little to undo this.  Boyne 
(2002) argues that 'expressions of class cultures are much more marked by 
reflexive attitudes  - 'rueful, ironic, envious, reflectively proud - than was the case 
in the picture painted by Bourdieu in 1979' (Boyne, 2002: 119).  It is true that 
some (by no means all) of the representations discussed here are marked by a 
knowingness, a  kind of ironic distancing.   But is this reflexivity, or merely the 
latest, postmodernism-inflected 'style' of disparaging working-class people?  Does 
the knowing smile really undo or undermine symbolic violence?  For Skeggs, 
'Irony enables the abdication of responsibility for the description while reproducing 
the historical stereotypes intact' (2003: 17).  We might ask what the political 
implications of such ironizing (insofar as it exists) might be, when it works to make 
present forms of identity and inequality that are officially shunned11.    
When class is either written out of the analysis altogether, or 'relegated' to 
being a minor player in a multiplicity of identities, it is irony that may bridge the 
gap between repudiating the idea of class, while simultaneously representing 
working-class people as disgusting and repellent.   This does not necessarily 
entail any of the self-scrutiny and self-awareness normally associated with 
reflexivity.  Indeed,  contemporary 'public' representations seem to be marked by 
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a notable lack of reflexivity, and there is virtually no real problematization of a 
normative and normalized middle-classed position.  We might ask, then, how 
white working-class subjects come to be marked as so ‘disgusting’. 
 
 
Disgusted subjects 
 
Disgust is an under-explored emotion (Dollimore, 2001), and this is especially true 
of classed disgust.  While the classed dimensions of ‘taste’ have been widely 
discussed, little attention has been given to the disgust that is aroused when 
‘good’ taste is seen to violated.  Yet disgust is an immensely powerful indicator of 
the interface between the personal and the social. The experience of disgust 
indicates par excellence that one is 'in the grip of a norm whose violation we are 
witnessing or imagining' (Miller, 1997: 194) and this grip is immediately felt within 
the body - it 'makes one sick' or 'makes one vomit' as Bourdieu (1986: 486) says.  
Feeling so personal, so visceral, it nevertheless invokes collective sentiments.  It 
relies on an affirmation that ‘we are not alone in our relation to the disgusting 
object’ (Probyn, 2000: 131). 
Disgust is a powerful emotion: involved in the work of drawing distinctions, 
it indicates that the drawing of such distinctions is laden with (negative) affect12.  
As William Miller notes: 
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Disgust, along with contempt, as well as other emotions in various settings, 
recognizes and maintains difference.  Disgust helps define boundaries 
between us and them, me and you.  It helps prevent our way from being 
subsumed into their way (Miller, 1997: 50)  
  
Space does not permit a discussion of the various ways in which disgust 
has been theorized13; but psychoanalytic and structuralist accounts alike have 
posited disgust, not as intrinsic to the ‘disgusting‘ object, but as inhering in the 
relationship between the disgusted and the object of disgust.  Further, these 
accounts  share an emphasis on an ontological grounding to disgust: part of who 
we are relies on not being (or liking) the disgusting object.  However, in this 
section, I want to consider a somewhat different, and specifically classed, 
perspective on disgust – or, more specifically, on the aesthetic that forms 
disgust’s ‘other’.  I want to turn to Bourdieu's brief analysis of Kant's Critique of 
Judgement14, - a text which he says is 'rightly regarded as the very symbol of 
philosophical distinction' (Bourdieu, 1986: 500) and which he suggests 
underwrites contemporary Euroamerican understandings of aesthetics and of 
taste.  Bourdieu attempts to uncover the social relationships which both inform 
this work and have been informed by it. 
In relation to judgements of taste, Kant's problematic (the mirror image of 
Bourdieu's own) is this: 
How, if at all, is it possible to judge something … as beautiful on the basis 
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of something very subjective, a feeling of pleasure, and yet demand for our 
judgement a universal assent?  That we do demand such assent is implicit 
in the very fact that we use the predicate 'beautiful' as if beauty were a 
property of things (which everyone ought to see) (Pluhar, 1987: xlvii,  
Emphasis in original). 
 
The answer is an appeal to a common humanity, a common aesthetic.  Yet clearly 
not everyone shares such an aesthetic.  Those 'who have no feeling for beautiful 
nature', preferring 'mere sense' to be got from eating and drinking, are regarded 
as 'coarse and ignoble' (Kant, 1987 [1790]:169-70).  This, for Bourdieu, is the 
claiming of a 'monopoly on humanity': it is a means by which the properly human 
is marked out by its innate ability to appreciate beauty (to have 'taste'): 
conversely, those lacking this property are lacking in humanity, if not non-human.   
Yet this marking is simply the result of the universalizing of a disposition 
which belongs to a specific location (cf. Haraway, 1991).  The language of 'ought' 
or ‘must’ (Sollen15) makes this disposition an imperative, or 'that sort of spurious 
constative which allows the author to remain silent as to the conditions of 
realization of what is in fact a performative utterance' (Bourdieu, 1986: 488-9).   
It is this performative aspect that is, I think, at the heart of Bourdieu's 
critique.  Kantian aesthetics is not simply about philosophical distinction, but 
brings into effect what it names – that is, a social authorization of an aesthetics in 
which ‘taste’ becomes a feature of an asocial and ahistorical ‘human nature’.  
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Within this aesthetics, the truly ‘beautiful’ is distinguished from the sensually 
‘pleasing’ on the basis of a mind (or soul)/ body dichotomy.  Unlike the facile 
pleasures of the flesh which anyone might enjoy, appreciation of beauty is held to 
demand a transcendence of the body that only some (those who are able to 
realize their ‘human nature’) can attain.  This dichotomy having been made, 
deviations from the properly tasteful (defined as an ability to appreciate ‘true 
beauty’) are made by definition facile, easy.   Such deviations can be seen as a 
facile aesthetic, giving in to sensual pleasures rather than transcending them. 
While for Kant this is a slippage from, or betrayal of, ‘human nature’, for Bourdieu 
it is an effect of social relations in which the middle classes have the authority to 
make their definitions work.  What gets to count as ‘tasteful’ is effected by those 
with the social power to name16.  It is possible to see, then, how definitions of 
aesthetics (and their appreciation) become mapped on to broader classed 
relations.   
Once an aesthetic is established as 'tasteful' those who fail to appreciate it 
can be robbed of any moral worth.  This is because there is a slippage between 
‘facile’ in terms of aesthetic dispositions and (morally) ‘easy’.  Those endowed 
with this appreciation are able to legitimately claim a place as 'properly human', 
while those who are seen as unable to appreciate what they ought to appreciate 
are rendered disgusting.  That they are represented as disgusting rather than 
merely ‘common’ indicates the degree to which they must be ‘pushed away’ – 
expelled from a normative and normalized middle-classness.  Disgust hinges on 
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proximity  (Miller, 1997; Probyn, 2000; Skeggs, 2004).  When legal barriers 
between classes get broken down, as in democracy, social hierarchy must be 
maintained in other ways: so, as Miller argues: 
[I]t was the advent of democratic principles that finally made ill manners 
and vulgarity not just a source of comedy but of terror and threat to those 
above.  And that's when the working class began to reek seriously, either 
of filth or of cologne (Miller, 1997: 253-4). 
 
In other words, ‘the lower classes smell’ because their (literal and 
metaphorical) smell is held to signal a dangerous proximity, which must then be 
guarded against, since to do otherwise would be to threaten the stability of 
middle-class claims on respectability (Skeggs, 2004).  These forms of distinction 
are not 'second order' moral sentiments related only contingently to class (Sayer, 
2002) nor are they concerned with an identity unrelated to class (Coole, 1996).  
Rather, they are at the very heart of an identity and a subjectivity which is 
classed.  Unconsciously incorporated, less through a dynamic repression than 
through a generative 'forgetting' of the minutiae of social training, a classed 
relation to the aesthetic /the disgusting is, for Bourdieu, at the heart of our being.  
Such a hold on ‘taste’ is not innate but an effect of unequal social and cultural 
processes.  But the irony is that Kantian aesthetics obscures its collective and 
classed basis through its emphasis on a unique individualism. 
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The one and the many 
 
There are in fact no masses; there are only ways of seeing people as 
masses (Raymond Williams, 'The masses', p. 46). 
 
Bourdieu argues that Kantian aesthetics rests on a specific kind of distinction; a 
form of individualism that marks out the bearer of taste as unique at the same 
time that s/he participates in a shared understanding of what taste is.  Like the 
Heideggerian  Das Ein, it designates a subject who has 'risen above' the facile, 
the easy, the mass.  We see here a form of individualism which divides the world 
into, on the one hand, a teeming mass and, against this, a class of people 
differentiated from the mass by virtue of being differentiated from each other.   
If the ownership of 'taste' marks out a uniqueness, then it is easy to see 
how taste as such can displace class as an explanatory schema:  if taste is about 
individual characteristics, and, furthermore, if its possession confers individuality, 
then any kind of collective, political explanation is written out.  What is obscured 
here is the ways in which such a schema relies on collective, class politics.  It 
derives, Bourdieu suggests, from an emergent bourgeoisie's attempts to claim 
'culture' for itself, and, in the process, to distinguish itself from its twin 'others' - the 
people and the Court, representing, respectively, 'nature' and civilization.  
'Civilization', for Kant, brings an alienation from nature, while 'the people' are too 
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much immersed in nature.  Those who are truly cultured eschew both alienation 
and immersion. This historical legacy is alive today in a continual iteration of class 
distinctions.   
So, for Bourdieu, Kant's principle of 'pure taste' is a means by which the 
middle classes distinguish themselves.  Its other - lack of taste - invokes a disgust 
which is projected on to their others. These groups  - but especially the working 
class, who are the subject of most attention, and for whom, in any case, such 
cultural domination matters - are understood in terms of a 'massification'. There is 
a fundamental opposition, argues Bourdieu, 'between the 'elite' of the dominant 
and the 'mass' of the dominated, a contingent, disorganized multiplicity, 
interchangeable and innumerable, existing only statistically’ (1986: 468).  Being 
constituted as a 'mass', they become the antithesis of individuality, threatening 'to 
swamp individual thinking and feeling' (Williams, 1958: 44). 
Indeed, they could hardly be so readily knowable through their 
appearance, or signified in terms of a few easy signifiers (bad clothes, bad food, 
bad taste) if they were not understood in terms of a 'mass'.  And the mass, 
Raymond Williams argues, is the successor to 'the mob' - child-like, savage and 
primitive (le Bon, 1896: see Blackman and Walkerdine, 2001).  Aesthetics has 
become translated into morality. As noted above, there is an elision between 
'facile' in the aesthetic sense and 'easy' in the moral sense, so that those 
positioned as lacking 'taste' can also be positioned as morally lacking.  In this 
way, philosophical definitions of aesthetics and taste become combined with 
  
 
 
 
 
26 
political concerns about the problem of order, the governance of populations, and 
the relations between state and citizen.   
This is precisely why working-class people are so readily judged by their 
appearance: because a facile aesthetic is read in terms of an 'easy' morality.  
Further, because everyone ought to have bourgeois taste, there is an assumption 
that those who are seen as lacking this taste must either not know any better, or 
must perversely lack the desire to become different.  There is an assumption, in 
other words, that working-class people should cease to show the signs of 
working-classness.  The irony here is that, when working class people do show 
signs of embourgeoisement, they can also be condemned for that (Roberts, 1999) 
or ridiculed as 'pretentious'.  Indeed, in a sense it matters little what working-class 
people actually do since their role is to act as a foil: a 'negative reference point, in 
relation to which all aesthetics define themselves, by successive negations' 
(Bourdieu, 1986: 57)17.  Taste may be unstable but this does not erase its classed 
relationality.  Witness the ways in which middle class taste shifts in the face of 
popularization and mass-consumption. 
Working-class people, in this context, become little more than personae in 
a bourgeois drama.  As the other, they are assumed to be knowable (Spivak, 
1997) and their subjectivities are assumed to be knowable through their 
appearance (Skeggs, 1997).  Their point, within this imaginary, is to be what the 
middle classes are not, could not possibly be, must defend against being, but on 
whom the projected fantasies of the middle class must come to rest.   
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But if 'the masses' are necessary, they are not only disgusting, but 
frightening and threatening.  They form the 'perpetual threat to culture' (Williams, 
1958: 44).  For Bourdieu, a whole network of cultural oppositions (between high 
and low, brilliant and dull, unique and common, and so on) entails an apocalyptic 
fear, for the middle classes, of being engulfed or swamped by an undifferentiated 
mass - a mass which lacks the singularity and individuality accorded to the elite.  
Themes of 'levelling' and ‘trivialization' betray 'an obsessive fear of number, of 
undifferentiated hordes indifferent to difference and constantly threatening to 
submerge the private spaces of bourgeois exclusiveness' (1986: 469).  
What is implied here is a recognition of (and horror at) sameness - that one 
could be like all those who lack 'taste', that one could be otherwise.  This is the 
other side to a classification of taste in terms of personal characteristics: if those 
who lack taste could (and should) be otherwise, then those who (are seen to) 
have taste could, similarly, be otherwise.  Hence, this sameness must be 
defended against in the form of barriers between classes.  I have argued here that 
one such barrier is 'taste', frequently manifest in its other, disgust, but in a sense 
this is arbitrary: the point is that it is part of a long-standing middle-class project to 
distinguish itself as different.  In relating the disgusting-ness of working-class 
existence, the story being told is that of middle-class distinction.   And this story is 
built on a collective history: the ‘I am I’ of bourgeois reflexive individualism 
(Giddens, 1994) both disguises, and rests on, the ‘We are not them’ of middle-
class identity-making. 
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Conclusion: the sour smell of distinction? 
Like the Freudian 'uncanny' or Simmel's 'trader' (Clarke, 2003)  the working 
class has become, for the middle class, a group both familiar and unfamiliar, 
known and unknown. No longer confined to the slums of the inner cities (cf. Finch, 
1993), they are both horrifically near and intriguingly distant: present in middle-
class homes virtually through 'reality-TV' programmes that hold them up to 
(middle-class) public humiliation, or actually, as domestic servants18, they are held 
to be knowable through signifiers of their massification.  At the same time this 
very massification renders them both other and unknowable.   
I have argued throughout this paper that disgust is one manifestation of a 
bourgeois project to distinguish the middle class from its others, a means of self-
constitution.  If this suggests an anxious and defensive bourgeois subject, this 
should not be taken in turn to suggest that the power relations embedded here 
are weak.  On the contrary, an entire social and cultural system works to continue 
the constitution of white working-class people as entirely devoid of value and 
worth (Skeggs, 2004). This is why Miller's solution to middle-class disgust seems 
unconvincing.  Miller argues for a kind of democratizing of disgust and contempt: 
'The battle is to have the high come to recognize the contemptible figure they cut 
before the low' (Miller, 1997: 236).  But the problem here is that working-class 
disgust and contempt for the middle class simply does not count: working-class 
people lack the social authority to make their judgements stick.  As Kathryn 
  
 
 
 
 
29 
Abrams comments, 'a war of disgusts is one that those less socially privileged are 
unlikely to win' (Abrams, 2002: 1454).  
Middle-class approaches to working-class existence have tended to veer 
between disgust and romanticism.  At the moment, it seems that disgust is 
winning out, but let me stress I am not advocating a return to romanticism.  
Recent work on working-class existence, largely written  by writers who are 
themselves from working-class backgrounds, indicates that it is possible to 
analyse working-class life without recourse to either romanticism or 
pathologization.  While to adequately summarize this rich and diverse work would 
require an article of its own19, it is worth noting that the work is characterized by a 
refusal of the historical legacy within which working-class people have been 
forced to account for themselves in narratives and ways of understanding that are 
imposed on them by middle-class observers. 
My concern here, however, has been to try to contribute to this debate by 
shifting the focus to middle-class existence and by attempting to problematize the 
normalcy of middle-classness.  Just as challenges have been mounted to the 
silent normalization of such privileged positions as whiteness, heterosexuality and 
masculinity, it is important to challenge and to go on challenging the assumption 
that middle-class dispositions, tastes and bodies are, by definition, the 'right' ones.  
It is important, in other words, to challenge an unmarked and unproblematized 
middle classness which claims a monopoly on 'true humanity'. 
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1
 As I discuss later, they might also be seen (though I think to a lesser degree) as feminized. 
 
2
 And as Angela McRobbie (2001) argues, if we return race to representations of working-class people (so 
that we are considering some people who are also Black) then the full force of comments made by even 
'liberal' observers becomes much more apparent.   
 
3
 and indeed has recently been reclaimed as a source of political and academic engagement and rethinking.  
See Wray and Newitz, 1997. 
 
4
 Certainly, white working-class people themselves do not occupy an ‘innocent’ position in all this: there are 
public forums which allow for expressions of working-class disgust and contempt at middle-class existence.  
But my contention here is that only some expressions count: only some voices will be heard and taken 
seriously.  This is all about power, but it is a form of power masked by its individualism and the 
foundational status which gets attached to taste, as later sections will discuss.    
 
5
 This class fraction broadly maps on to Bourdieu’s ‘dominated fraction of the dominant class’ – high in 
cultural capital but (relatively) low in economic capital.  Little surprise, then, that their expressions of 
disgust occur around the axis of cultural capital. 
 
6
 As Miller notes, ' There is not much difficulty in discerning the difference between tattoos designed to 
shock one's parents and those designed to identify with them' (1997: 209) 
 
7
 See, for example, Morrison (1997); Dennis and Erdos (1992) 
 
8
 The charge of retrogression is a recurring one and is arguably itself a means of distinction.  As Nikolas 
Rose (1991: 18) notes, the working class are seen as suffering from a 'cultural lag'.  And Bourdieu argues 
that, 'not only reason and modernity but also the movement of change are on the side of the governors - 
ministers, employers or 'experts'; unreason and archaism, inertia and conservatism are on the side of the 
people, the trade unions and critical intellectuals (Bourdieu, 1998: 25) 
 
9
 Their transgressions included failing to rigidly toilet-train their children and failing to feed infants 'by the 
clock', preferring to demand-feed.  The practices for which working-class people were condemned in the 
1950s are now prescribed by health-care professionals.  I am not claiming that working-class people have 
therefore 'got it right', but, as I argue later, that more or less whatever they do is 'wrong'. 
 
10
 And of course if racism comes to be seen only as embodied in the white working class, the institutional 
racism of the state, as well as racism on the part of middle-class people, becomes obscured. 
 
11
 I am indebted here to McRobbie’s characterization of responses to contemporary feminism (McRobbie, 
2003: 133). 
 
12
  Miller makes an important distinction between disgust and contempt.  Although both 'assert a superior 
ranking as against their subject' (Miller, 1997: 32) disgust, unlike contempt, is never indifferent to its object.  
Disgust appears to demand a certain visibility. 
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13
 But see, for example, Douglas, 1992: Kristeva; 1982;  Probyn, 2000;  
 
14
 I mean by this that Bourdieu’s explicit critique of Kant is brief.  Clearly, the whole of Distinction is an 
extended, if implicit, critique of Kant’s Critique of Judgement. 
 
15
 Thanks to Annie Meyer for clarifying the translation. 
 
16
 This is similar to Skeggs’ (2004) analysis of the ways in which negative value is attached to working-class 
people.  As Skeggs asks, who decides what counts as negative? (Skeggs, 2004: 102). 
 
17
 Although at other points, Bourdieu seems to essentialize classed taste by talking of the distinction between 
the 'taste of necessity and the taste of luxury’ (1986: 178) I find his argument that the working class forms a 
negative foil to the middle class more convincing, not least because of the ways in which tastes shift over 
time (though the properly 'tasteful' is always owned by the middle classes). 
 
18
 This may look like an archaism but I am thinking here, not only of full-time servants, but of the many 
working-class women who clean middle-class homes and mind middle-class children.  See Skeggs, 1997; 
Ehrenreich, 2002; Toynbee, 2003.  
 
19
 Much of this work has come from within feminism.  See Hey (2003) for an overview of some of this 
work. 
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